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FIRST ENGLISH EVANGELICAL 
LUTHERAN CHURCH OF GLENDALE 
v. 
CO. OF LOS ANGELES 
,,.--- ~ 
/ ~~peal from Cal. Ct. App. 
u ho;np s on, Li 11 ie, Johnson) 
State/Civ. Timely 
1. SUMMARY: Appnt argues that the Cal. Ct. App. erred in 
holding that the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not 
require compensation if a regulation limits the use of property 
so long as it does not deprive the property owner of 
substantially all reasonable use of his property. 
2. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW: This case involves what 
used to be called Lutherglen, a campground maintained by appnt on 
21 acres of land in the mountains of the Angeles National Forest 





north of the city of Los Angeles. The camp was developed by 
appnt as a place for retreats and recreation by church members 
and handicapped children of all denominations. In the winter of 
1977-1978, a forest fire denuded the hills around Lutherglen and 
subsequent rainfall caused a flood which destroyed the camp. 
After the storm, the appee adopted Ordinance No. 11855, which 
temporarily prohibited any construction in the area. Appee 
subsequently made the ( prohibition permanen. See Los Angeles 
County Code §§22.44.220, 22.44.230; Ordinance No. 12413. The 




Appnt filed an inverse condemnation action against appee, 
claiming, inter alia, that this limitation on the use of its land 
constitutes a taking of property without just compensation in 
violation of Art. 1, §19 of the California Constitution. The 
trial court struck this portion of the complaint based on Agins 
v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal.3d 266 (1979), which held that 
mandamus or declaratory relief rather than damages is the 
appropriate remedy for a regulation that does not on its face 
"deprive the landowner of substantially all reasonable use of his 
property." Id., at 277. 
The Cal. Ct. App. affirmed on the authority of Agins v. City 
of Tiburon, supra. It rejected appnt's argument that this 
Court's opinions in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 
450 U.S. 621 (1981), disapproved the doctrine adopted in Agins 
that a State may limit the remedy available for anything 








observed that only the four dissenting Justices stated that money 
compensation must be provided if a land use regulation amounts to 
a taking. Although JUSTICE REHNQUIST stated in a concurring 
opinion that if he "were satisfied that this appeal were from a 
'final judgment or decree' ••• [he] would have little difficulty 
in agreeing with much of what is said in the dissenting opinion 
of JUSTICE BRENNAN," 450 U.S., at 633-634, no more than four 
Justices expressly stated that they would reject the position 
established in Agins. Until the Supreme Court squarely states 
otherwise, Agins remains the controlling authority in California. 
The Cal. Sup. Ct. denied review. 
3. CONTENTIONS: Appnt argues that the California judiciary 
has ~~ charted a course that is at odds with this 
Court's teachings regarding the Taking Clause. The Cal. Sup. Ct. 
has reiterated its position in Agins, see Furey v. City of 
Sacramento, 24 Cal.3d 862 (1979), and refused numerous 
opportunities to review lower court decisions applying Agins. 
See e.g., MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, No. 84-
2015 (probable juris. noted). Despite this Court's apparent 
Diego Gas & Electric Co., supra, the 
to adhere to its position absent a 
direct ruling. This conflicts with the interpretation of San 
Diego Gas & Electric, supra, adopted by numerous federal courts, 
which have read it to express the view that California's 
treatment of property owners is constitutionally unacceptable. 
See, e.g., Hernandez v. LaFayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1199-1200 (CAS 




1984), rev'd on other grounds, u. s. (1985); Barbian v. 
Panagis, 694 F.2d 476, 482 n. 5 (CA7 1982); Nemers v. City of 
Dubuque, 764 F.2d 502, 505 n. 2 (CAB 1085); In re Air Crash in 
Bali, 684 F.2d 1301, 1311 n. 7 (CA9 1982); Martinov. Santa Clara 
Valley County Water District, 703 F.2d 1141, 1148 (CA9 1983); 
Fountain v. Metro Atlantic Rapid Transit Authority, 678 F.2d 
1038, 1043 (CAll 1982). But see Citadel Corp. v. Puerto Highway 
Authority, 695 F.2d 31, 33 n. 4 (CAl 1982). 
Resp argues that even if appnt is correct in its attack on 
Agins, this case would not be a good vehicle for overturning that 
decision because the challenged ordinance does not impose 
sufficient limitations on the use of Lutherglen to amount to a 
taking. Thus, even under the traditional approach to alleged 
violations of the Taking Clause, this case involves a valid 
exercise of the State's inherent police power to protect and 
preserve the public safety and welfare. 
Petr replies that the state courts did not base their 
decision on this ground, but simply applied the categorical Agins 
doctrine. 
4. DISCUSSION: Although it appears from the Cal. Ct. 
App.'s decision that petr's complaint only invoked the Taking 
Clause of the State Constitution, the Ct. ·App. clearly treated --------
the claim as arising under the Taking Clause of the Federal ~ -- ---- -· .... Constitu t 1on. It rested its decision on Agins, and stated that 
this Court's decision in San Diego Gas & Electric did not rule on 
whether Agins represents a correct interpretation of the federal 




adequate and independent state ground. See Michigan v. Long, 463 
U.S. 1032 (1983). 
The specific question raised in this case is identical to 
the question set for review in MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. 
/I 
County of Yold, , No. 84-2015, prob. juris. noted. I disagree with 
resp's ~ on that the regulation here is substantially less 
burdensome than the regulation involved in Yolo, and thus the 
case would necessarily be affirmed even if Agins is overturned. 
Accordingly, I recommend that this case be held for Yolo. 
There is a response. 
February 25, 1986 Guynn Opn in ptn 
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MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
~ IA>-{. ~ 
~/24' A--L.- ,le, 
Re: held for:?MacD,efnald, Sommer 
______ v. Yolo,/No. 84-2015 
&~t>/~-
'7f:j•' .~& 
.:...:,:..:..::~-=~=-;;:;.;;.:;--=~-=:...,...i .;; ,..;i~i-..;•;;,.;c;;..;a;:;.l~C=h-=u-=-r-=c~h v. County of ~
Los Angeles, No. , 85-1199 is an appeal from a 
judgment of the alif ia Court of Appeal. I shal~ ~ 
vote to note prob e jurisdiction. ~--Appellant had erected a dining hall, two ~u 
bunkhouses, a caretaker's lodge, an outdoor chapel, 
and a footbridge on 12 acres of its 21-acre private ~ 
campground in the Angeles National Forest. After a 
severe flood destroyed the campsite, the County 
enacted an ordinance, S 1 of which states: 
•A person shall not construct, 
reconstruct, place or enlarge any building 
or structure, any portion of which is, or 
will be, located within the outer boundary 
lines of the interim flood protection area 
located in Mill Creek Canyon.• App. to 
Juris. Statement A31. 
Appellant, a~leging that this ordinance denied 
it all beneficial use of its property and effected a 
• ak1ng, oug amages 1 ornia Superior 
Court. The Superior Court judge bifurcated the jury 
trial into liability and damages phases. At the 
close of appellant's evidence on liability, the trial 
court granted the County's motion for nonsuit. The 
rationale of the trial court was as follows: 
•aowever, a careful reading of the 
Agins [v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal.3d 266, 
598 P.2d 25 (1979)] case persuades t~ e 
(}.__ 
jVo'ft -~ - ~ ,/4/rL _u ~ 







court that when an ordinance, even a non-
zoning ordinance, deprives a person of the 
tot~ s lands, his challenge to 
the ordinance is b way ~f ~decl~ratory 
relie or s y mand~ pp. to 
Juris. a emene 6. 
The California Court of Appeal affirmed on the 
same ground: 
•we conclude that because the United 
States Supreme Court has not yet ruled on 
the question of whether a state may 
constitutionally limit the remedy for a 
taking to nonmonetary relief, this Court is 
obligated to follow Agins. -•The order striking the cause of 
action for damages in inverse condemnat i on 
based on the ordinance ~ App. 
to Juris. Statement Al6 (citation omitted). 
In my view, appellant's constitutional c l aim is 
substantial and an a~l _Noper. Appellant's claim 
for damages was den ied soTely on the round that in 
Califq~ n a a~ages are no ava1l~ble for a egu atory 
t a king"; appellant ' s c orfs t""i t uTI"'ona r con t en t i ons 
notwithstanding. Although the County asserts that 
its Code allows appellant to construct accessory 
buildings and structures, because the ordinance 
forbids appellant from erecting any •principal• 
structures, an opportunity to build •accessory• 
structures is illusory. Moreover, t his ground was 
not and could not have been the basis of the 
affirmance of the judgment below (it appears that an 
appellate court in California can affirm a trial 
judge's nonsuit only on the basis invoked by the j 
trial court). This case, therefore, ~ uarely 
presents the co stitutional at ack to a preclusion of 
monetary remedies for a reg ~ king, and is in 
my view deserving of review. 
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FIRST ENGLISH EVANGELICAL 
LUTHERAN CHURCH OF GLENDALE 
v. 




of Appellee to 
SUMMARY: On June 30, 1986, the Court noted probable 
jurisdiction in this case to review a California state court's 
order striking appellant's inverse condemnation claim against 
appellee. Appellant's complaint, which sought monetary damages, 
alleged that a recently-enacted county ordinance had deprived 
appellant of any viable use of its property. In this motion, 
ap~ s that the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear 
appellant's claim because (1) appellant did not initially 
challenge the subject ordinance as being "repugnant to the 
Constitution"; and (2) the federal question involved was n~t. n -
--(wl__ ...,,.,.,+~ ·, <; t ' ... b «ti j uw~ '. tv f '. O\J",. I 'c1::e€... -t'~ "'-" 
o-Dl\ O>A ~ l,e_ ~ L-&J (<ovJ2J) 
I 
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actually "heard and decided" by the California courts. 
BACKGROUND: In the winter of 1977-1978, a forest fire 
denuded a portion of the Angeles National Forest (north of Los 
Angeles, California). Subsequent rainfall caused flooding which 
destroyed a campground and retreat (Lutherglen) owned by 
appellant. After the fire and resulting floods, the appellee 
adopted an ordinance which limited construction in Angeles 
National Forest--including the area around Lutherglen. The 
ordinance prohibits the reconstruction of buildings swept away by 
the 1977-1978 disaster . 
In 1979, appellant filed an inverse condemnation action in 
the California courts. Appellant's complaint sought monetary 
damages from appellants on several grounds including an 
allegation that the county ordinance "denies [appellant] all use 
of Lutherglen." Appellee moved to strike appellant's claim for 
damages based on the California Supreme Court's decision in Agins 
v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal.3d 266 (1979), which held that "such 
an ordinance must be attacked through the remedy of declaratory 
relief or mandamus." In response to appellee's motion, appellant 
argued that the ordinance's prohibitions against reconstruction 
of the demolished facilities at Lutherglen was "a taking for 
which the U.S. Constitution requires compensation." The trial 
court granted appellee's motion, finding that under Agins, "when 
an ordinance ••• deprives a person of the total use of his 
lands, his challenge to the ordinance is by way of declaratory 
relief or possibly mandamus." 
The California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's 
- -- 3 -
decision. In its opinion, the court characterized appellant's 
action as a claim "for damages for the uncompensated taking of 
all use of Lutherglen by County Ordinance No. 11,855" and 
summarized appellant's argument as follows: 
"[Appellant] .•. argues that the trial court's 
reliance on Agins is misplaced because the United 
States Supreme Court disapproved Agins in San Diego Gas 
& Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981) •• 
[Appellant] contends that despite the Supreme Court's 
dismissal of the appeal in San Diego Gas, a combined 
total of five Justices through dissenting and 
concurring opinions disapproved the view that a state 
may limit the remedy available for taking to 
nonmonetary relief." 
The Court of Appeal rejected appellant's argument on the 
ground that only the four dissenting Justices in San Diego Gas 
reached the issue of the availability of monetary damages. The 
court concluded that "the United States Supreme Court has not yet 
ruled on the question of whether a state may constitutionally 
limit the remedy for a taking to nonmonetary relief" and 
therefore the state appellate court was "obligated to follow 
Agins." 
Appellants petitioned the California Supreme Court for 
review claiming, inter alia, that the county ordinance in this 
case violated the Just Compensation Clause of the United States 
Constitution. The California Supreme Court denied the petition 
on October 17, 1985. 
On January 15, 1986, appellants filed a jurisdictional 
statement with this Court. The issues identified in appellant's 
statement include: (1) When a local government agency regulates 
private property in such a way that no economically viable use is 
left to the owner, has the property been "taken" within the 
I 
- -- 4 -
meaning of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments? and (2) Does 
California's unique rule (i.e., that just compensation is never 
an appropriate remedy for a regulatory taking of property) 
violate the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments? 
On February 14, 1986, appellees filed a motion to dismiss. 
The gist of appellee's 6-page motion was that, although the 
ordinance in question "partially prohibited" the construction 
permitted on Lutherglen, there had been no showing that the 
ordinance "eliminated any and all viable economic use of the 
land." 
On June 30, 1986, the Court noted probable jurisdiction. 
On September 9, 1986, appellant filed its brief on the merits. 
On the same day, appellee filed the instant 15-page motion to 
dismiss. 
APPELLEE'S CONTENTIONS: Appellee brings this motion to 
dismiss under the authority of Supreme Court Rule 16.1. Appellee 
does not address the question of the timeliness of its motion; 
nor does appellee offer any explanation for its failure to 
challenge the Court's jurisdiction on these grounds in the first 
motion to dismiss. 
In support of the motion, appellee advances two arguments. 
First, appellee contends that the Court lacks appellate 
jurisdiction in this case because appellant's state court filings 
do not directly "draw into question the validity of [the 
ordinance] •.• on the ground of its being repugnant to the 
Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States." See 28 
u.s.c. §1257(2). Appellee argues that the constitutional 
- -- 5 -
validity of a state regulation is not "drawn into question" every 
time an act done under authority of the regulation is disputed. 
Citing United States v. Lynch, 137 U.S. 280, 285 (1890). 
Appellee asserts that it is "well-established that 
appellate jurisdiction will not lie where the claim is of an 
unconstitutional exercise of authority under a valid ordinance." 
Citing zucht v. King, 260 U.S. 174, 177 (1922) . 1 Here, appellee 
points out that appellant has alleged only that appellee did not 
pay just compensation for the "taking" of Lutherglen. Appellee 
suggests that this allegation does not "challenge the facial 
validity of the ordinance" and therefore the California courts 
have not had an opportunity to rule on the constitutionality of 
the regulation. 
Second, appellant argues that the Court cannot review the 
California Court of Appeal's decision by way of certiorari 
because the federal question advanced by appellant was not 
"raised and decided in the state courts." Citing Cardinale v. 
Louisiana, 394 U.S. 437 (1969). Appellee asserts that the 
California Court of Appeal reviewed appellant's "taking" claim 
only under the California constitution and interpretative case 
law (i.e., the Agins case). Therefore, appellee suggests, the 
1 In support of this argument, appellee cites three more 
recent examples of the Court's reluctance to exercise appellate 
jurisdiction in cases where the validity of the state statute in 
question has not been directly challenged: Kulka v. Superior 
Court of California, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Calder v. Jones, 465 
U.S. 783 (1984); and Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 
U.S. 555 (1979). 
I 
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California court's "off-handed" discussion of the federal 
constitutional issues involved in this case was "not necessary" 
to the state court's disposition of appellant's claim. 
APPELLANT'S CONTENTIONS: In its response, appellant argues 
that appellee's motion is (1) untimely, (2) factually inaccurate 
and (3) legally unsound. First, appellant objects to appellee's 
"second motion to dismiss" on the ground that it is "tardy." 
Under Supreme Court Rule 16.1, a motion to dismiss must be filed 
within 30 days of the jurisdictional statement. The instant 
motion was filed seven months late and more than three months 
after the Court noted jurisdiction. Appellant notes that the 
grounds advanced in support of the motion are based on "facts" 
available to appellee at the time it filed its first motion. 
Appellant complains that appellee has not offered any explanation 
for its failure to timely raise these challenges to the Court's 
jurisdiction in February 1986. Furthermore, since a copy of the 
California Court of Appeal's opinion accompanied appellant's 
jurisdictional statement, appellant suggests that the Court has 
already made its own determination regarding jurisdiction. 
Second, appellant contends that appellee's motion is 
factually inaccurate. Appellant argues that appellee is simply 
"wrong" when it alleges that the constitutional issue in this 
case was not properly preserved in the state courts. Appellant 
notes that California is a "fact pleading" state and, therefore, 
appellant's complaint--which includes an allegation that the 
county ordinance "denied [appellant] all use of Lutherglen"--is 
sufficient to raise the "taking" issue for review by the Court. 
- -- 7 -
Furthermore, appellant alleges that the issue was presented and 
decided in the California Court of Appeal. Appellant refers the 
Court to the specific pages in appellant's state court pleadings 
which raise the "taking" issue and the particular passages of the 
California Court of Appeal's opinion in which the court disposed 
of appellant's claims. Appellant also cites several cases in 
which this Court exercised its appellate jurisdiction to review 
"taking" claims under similar circumstances: Agins v. City of 
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 {1980); San Diego Gas, supra; and 
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. 
91 L. Ed. 2d 2 8 5 { 19 8 6) • 
County of Yolo, 477 U.S. __ , 
Finally, appellant disagrees with appellee's assertion that 
the California Supreme Court's decision in Agins was based solely 
on state constitutional law. Appellant points out numerous 
references to the Just Compensation Clause {and federal case law) 
in the California Supreme Court's opinion Agins 2 and argues that 
the fact that this Court eventually exercised appellate 
jurisdiction over the issue in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 
255 {1980), suggests that the Court felt that the state court's 
decision was based on an interpretation of the federal 
constitution. Appellant rejects appellee's suggestion that the 
California Supreme Court's decision in Agins was based on 
2 Appellant notes that the California Supreme Court has a 
"long-standing" policy of treating "taking issues" as matters of 
federal law. Citing Brookes v. City of Oakland, 160 Cal. 423, 
427 {1911). 
- -- 8 -
independent state grounds. Appellant points out that a state 
court may interpret state law in a way which provides more 
protection than the United States Constitution requires, but it 
may not interpret state law so as to diminish a constitutionally-
protected right (such as the right to just compensation}. Citing 
Joslin Mfg. Co. v. City of Providence, 262 U.S. 668, 676-677 
(1932). 
DISCUSSION: Although Supreme Court Rule 16.1 provides a 
30-day period in which to file a motion to dismiss, the questions -----raised by the instant motion challenge the Court's jurisdiction 
over this case and therefore may be considered at any juncture in 
the proceedings. While this motion provides the Court with an 
opportunity to reconsider probable jurisdiction, the motion does 
not raise any issue which was not (at least implicitly} before 
the Court when it voted to note jurisdiction in this case. I 
therefore recommend that the Court defer action on the motion 
until after the case is fully briefed on the merits. 
Although it is- not always- easy to distinguish between a 
constitutionally invalid statute and an improper "exercise" of 
authority under a statute, the constitutionality of the ordinance 
in this case appears to have been directly "drawn into question" 
by the pleadings and decisions below. See Agins v. City of 
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980) and MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. 
County of Yolo, 477 U.S. , 91 L.Ed.2d 285 (1986). In Agins, 
for example, the Court exercised its appellate jurisdiction and 
then determined, after the matter had been fully briefed and 
argued by the parties, that the ordinance in question did not (as 
' 
- -- 9 -
a factual matter) involve a "taking" of the appellant's property. 
Even if the Court (at some point) determines that 
appellant's challenge to the ordinance in question will not 
support an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, the case appears 
to raise a substantial federal question which is worthy of 
plenary consideration. The question of the constitutionality of 
California's refusal to allow monetary claims in inverse 
condemnation cases has arisen several times in the past but has 
so far alluded direct review by this Court. See San Diego Gas & 
Electric, supra, and Agins, supra. In this case, the issue has 
been clearly raised in the proceedings below and was decided by 
the California Court of Appeal on the basis of its reading of 
San Diego Gas & Electric. The California Court of Appeal 
concluded that this Court has not ruled on the question of 
whether California's prohibition against monetary damages in an 
inverse condemnation action is consistent with the Just 
Compensation Clause and, therefore, the California appellate 
court was duty-bound to follow the California Supreme Court's 
analysis of the federal constitutional issue in Agins. Since the 
state court's ruling did not rest on an independent state ground, 
it appears that the Court will have an opportunity to address the 
issue which appears to have alluded consideration by the Court in 
San Diego Gas & Electric. 
CONCLUSIONS: I recommend that the Court defer its ruling on 
jurisdiction until the parties have briefed and argued all the 
issues. It appears that the Court will be able to reach the --cons tit u ti on al issue raised by appellant through the exercise of 
- -- 10 -
either its appellate or discretionary jurisdiction. Since the 
ultimate determination of the jurisdictional question may be 
influenced by the parties' briefs and oral argument and (if 
necessary) can be addressed in the Court's opinion on the case, 
there is no need for the Court to enter a separate order on the 
motion at this time. 
Appellant has filed a response. 
9/23/86 Niddrie 
- - ~ ---
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BENCH MEMORANDUM 
To: Justice Powell January 6, 1987 
From: Bob 
No. 85-1199, First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County 
of Los Angeles 
Appeal from Cal. Ct. App. 
Wednesday, January 14, 1987 (4th case) 
Questions Presented 
1. Does the Court have appellate or certiorari 
jurisdiction? 
2. Are appant's claims ripe? 
---/~ 
• 
- - 2. 
3. If a regulation is determined to effect a taking, may 
the court simply invalidate the ordinance without requiring 
payment of damages? 
4. Is appant required to bring this action under 42 u.s.c. 
§1983? 
I. BACKGROUND 
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale (the 
Church) operated Lutherglen, a came_ for church members, 
handicapped children, and others in the mountains north of Los 
Angeles. The camp was located in Mill Creek canyon, on 12 acres 
of a 21-acre parcel owned by the Church. By 1978 the camp 
comprised an outdoor vfhapel, ~ ing hall ~ aretaker's lodge, two 
bunkhouses, and a footbridge across the creek. The Church knew 
that the campsite was subject to flooding and took measures to 
protect the camp and to evacuate campers in an emergency. A 
L,F-6rest fire in 1977 increased the risk of flooding. 
In February 1978 a devastating flood destroyed the camp. 
In response, Los Angeles County adopted a temporary flood / ~ 
protection ordinance, No. 11,855, prohibiting the construction, ~ 
reconstruction, ----- or enlargement of any building within a designated area close to Mill Creek. The designated area 
includes the 12-acre site of Lutherglen, although it does not 
include all of the 21-acre parcel. In 1981, the County adopted a 
permanent ordinance, No. 
Flood Protection District, 
12,413, 
which 
area as the temporary ordinance. 
establishing the 
covers the same 




- - 3. 
The Church filed its complaint about five weeks after 
Ordinance No. 11,855 was adopted. In November 19 79 the Cal. 




inverse condemnation, on the ground that "when an 
ordinance, even a non-zoning ordinance, deprives a person of the ~ 
total use of his land, his challenge to the ordinance is by wa~ 
of declaratory relief or possibly mandamus." 
~~~~ 
J .S. App. 26. The  · 
Cal. Ct. on the basis of the Cal. Sup. Ct.' s ~ 
decision ,1 
/ 
..-?t<~.L, ... ~ 
• City of Tiburon, 598 P. 2d 25 {1979), aff'd +() 
on other 447 U.S. 255 (1980). 
Agins to limit the remedy for a taking 
The Cal. Ct. App. read ~ 
to nonmonetary relief. ~ 
The Cal. Sup. Ct. denied the petn. for review . 
II. DISCUSSION 
This is the fifth time the Court has heard argument on the ~ 
$ '1:-: -
question whether the remedy for a regulation that is found to ~ 7 
take property may be limited to invalidation of the regulation. 
See MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo (MS&F), 106 S. 
Ct. 2561 (1986); Williamson County Reg. Planning Comm. v. 
Hamilton Bank, 105 S.Ct. 3108 (1985); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. 
v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Agins v. City of 
Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980). I have concluded that none of the ..J}P?-
"preliminary" issues should prevent the Court from reaching the ~ 
merits. I hope the Justices agree! Because I agree with JUSTICE 
~ 
BRENNAN's dissenting opinion in San Diego Gas, which you joined, ~ 
I will not discuss the merits at length. 
• 
- - 4. 
1. Jurisdiction. I am inclined to think this is not a 'J'U, f-
~ 
proper appeal. Although this case may have "drawn in question~ 
the validity of [a State] statute ... on the ground of its being ~ 
repugnant to the Constitution," 28 u.s.c. §1257(2), it does not 
appear that "the decision is in favor of its validity," ibid. 
The California courts did not hold that the temporary or the 
~
permanent ordinance is valid; they merely held that appant could 
not challe_nge either ordinance through an inverse condemnation 
'--
action. I note that the Court accepted appellate jurisdiction in 
MS&F without discussion. 106 s. Ct., at 2566. (The challenge in 
MS&F was to the application of a zoning ordinance and 
regulations.} MS&F, however is distinguishable: as discussed 
below, that opinion concludes that the California courts held 
that the zoning regulations were valid as applied to MS&F. Id., 
at 2565. 
Of course the issue is certworthy. The Church's r 
complaint, however, alleges only a violation of the State /?,1,c../-
Constitution. J.A. 15. Before the Cal. Ct. App. the Church d ~ 
----- I"µ 
rely on the dissenting opinion in San Diego Gas, and the Ct. App. ~/4Ld 
discussed that case in its opinion. J.S. Al5-Al6. Under C~~ 
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983), this Court has ~/. 
jurisidiction unless it appears from the face of the opinion that 
the case was decided on state law grounds. Although this is far 
less than one could hope for, I think it is enough to present the 
federal constitutional question. 
2. Ripeness and Finality. The Court has held that it 
"follows from the nature of a regulatory takings claim that an 
• 
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essential prerequisite to its assertion is a final and 
authoritative determination of the type and intensity of 
development legally permitted on the subject property." MS&F, 
106 S. Ct., at 2566. Because the Church's complaint was 
dismissed, I think the Court is justified in accepting as true --
its allegations that there has been a final determination that 
~
deprives the Church of any economic use of its land. ------- -------------- .--....._ 
MS&F was decided on a demurrer. Under California law, 
properly pleaded factual allegations in a complaint are deemed 
admitted for the purpose of deciding a demurrer, but mere 
"contentions" or "conclusions of fact or law" are not accepted as 
true. Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. Rptr 724, 737, 433 P.2d 
732, 745 (1967). The complaint in MS&F alleged that the owner 
"was deprived of all beneficial use of its property," and that 
further development applications would be futile. See 106 S. 
Ct., at 2568 n. 8. The Court nevertheless concluded that the 
holdings of the California courts left open the possibility that 
some development would be permitted. Id., at 2568. The Court 
relied on a statement by the tc that the property "had obvious 





App. 's "alternative holding" that the facts alleged in MS&F's 
complaint failed to state a cause of action for inverse 
condemnation because a less intensive development plan might be 
approved. 106 S. Ct., at 2564-2565. You joined JUSTICE WHITE's f 
dissent in MS&F, which takes the view that MS&F did sufficiently ~ 
allege a final decision depriving it of all beneficial use of its 
• 
- - 6. 
property, and that the Cal. Ct. App. accepted the allegation that 
further applications would be futile. 
The finality problems in this case are less troublesome. 
Appant, like the appant in MS&F, alleged in its complaint that ~ 
a,..;.---. - - ~ 
Ordinance 11,855 
~
"denies ---- [appant] all use of Lutherglen." J .A. -
,,~ 
~ 
12. Neither the tc nor the Cal. Ct. App. appear to have relied ~ • 
on any "alternative holdings" that the restrictions imposed by 
the ordinance are not final, or that some beneficial uses of the 
Lutherglen property are permitted under the ordinance. Instead, 
both courts accepted the allegations of the complaint. J.S. A-
13, A-26. The County argues that this case was decided on a 
"motion to strike" rather than on a "demurrer," and that the 
former motion does not require any assumptions about the veracity 
of allegations in the complaint. I do not think this distinction 
makes a difference. In the County's own words, the State court 
held that "if an ordinance is claimed to have deprived a person 
of the total use of his lands, his proper challenge is by way of 
declaratory relief or possibly mandamus." Red brf. 24. 
Inevitably, the situation will become far more complicated 
if the Court looks behind the "conclusory" allegations of the 
complaint. There is considerable evidence in the record that the 
Church has been deprived of all economically feasible uses of its 
property, and that the decision of the County is final. Both 
the temporary and the permanent ordinances provide that the 
Church "sha11· not construct, . • . modify, enlarge or reconstruct 
any building or · structure within the boundaries of a flood 
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permitted to use the land for camping in tents, but no one 
suggests that this would be economically viable (and it probably 
would not be suitable for the handicapped). The County 
emphasizes that some of the 21-acre parcel is outside the flood-
control district. The County concedes that the unregulated land 
is mountainous, but asserts that parts of it may be suitable for 
camp buildings. This does not seem relevant to me even if it is 
true. If the regulation of the 12-acre tract in the canyon "goes 
too far," the fact that 'the Church happens to own a contiguous 
tract of land that ' is left unregulated should not "cure" the 
taking. The County also notes that petr has not applied for 
permission to change the boundaries of the flood control 
district, to obtain a variance, or to build any "accessory" 
structures. The County has just established the boundaries of 
the flood control district after a period of study. It seems 
unlikely that they would agree to alter the boundaries 
immediately. Variances, according to the County, may be granted 
for such things as building line setbacks, yards, open space, and 
"buffer areas." Red brf. at 22. If the Church cannot erect any 
buildings, I cannot see how a variance would help them. ~ 
The permanent ordinance allows construction of "accessory ~ ~ 
buildings" with the approval of the County Engineer. An 
"accessory building," the County asserts, is one incidental to 
the "main use" of the land, which in this case is "resort and 
recreation." Red brf. 19-20. The County seems to be suggesting 
that the Church might be permitted to rebuild its entire camp as 
"accessory" to its recreational activities. I think this is a 
• 
- - 8. 
strained reading of the ordinance, which defines accessory 
buildings as detached subordinate buildings. Perhaps a direct -
question at oral argument will produce a concession that a camp 
cafeteria or dormitory, for example, could not qualify as a 
subordinate building. The complaint refers only to the temporary 
ordinance, which does not allow any exceptions for "accessory 
buildings." The Court might hold simply that the temporary 
ordinance effected a taking for the period it was in effect. 
Finally, the County notes that the Church's use of the land was 
quite restricted even before the passage of the flood control 
ordinances. In fact, the Church had to obtain a special use 
permit to operate a camp on the property. This certainly does 
not compel that conclusion that the Church had no reasonable 
expectation of continuing to operate a camp on the Lutherglen 
site. 
3. The Merits. It seems unlikely that the resolution of 
the merits will be pre-determined by the Court's decision in No. 
85-1092, Keystone Bituminous Coal Assoc. v. DeBenedictus. 
Al though a majority of the Court apparently wi 11 affirm CA3 's 
holding that there was no taking in that case, your Conference 
notes suggest that the Court will not overrule Pennsylvania v. 
Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922}. Thus, it is likely that "regulation 
that goes too far" still constitutes a taking. 
I am in substantial agreement with JUSTICE BRENNAN's 
dissent in San Diego Gas. "Regulation" may shift the benefits of I 
ownership from the owner to the public just as surely as formal 
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• a taking even if there is no formal exercise of the power of 
condemnation. Even if the deprivation is only temporary, it is 
nonetheless a deprivation, and so just compensation should be 
paid. Although this approach is not free from difficulty, I am 
convinced that the alternative approach espoused by JUSTICE 
• 
STEVENS in the Williamson County case is far more problematic. 
If the Cal. Sup. Ct.' s view were permitted to stand, state and 
local governments would be free to enact any regulation they 
pleased, subject only to the possibility that a court eventually 
would invalidate the regulation. Even if the owner eventually 
obtained relief in the cts, the government might pass a similar 
regulation and so require the owner to return to the cts. 
The most persuasive argument on the other side, in my S G- '-s-
view, is made by the SG. He argues that the "origin~ 
--~~ 
understanding" of the Fifth Amendment was that it did not by its ;;;::-
own terms require . payment of damages for takings. The SG relies ~ 
particularly on the doctrine of sovereign immunity. He cites ~ " ~-~ 
several early state court decisions holding that the remedy for a ~ 
taking is to hold the unconstitutional statute "a nullity," or to 5 G, 't 
~'4 •. .( 
sue the state officers for trespass. SG brf. 19-20. The SG also -1-o 
relies on Art. I, §9, cl. 7, which, in the SG's view, provides f>'1 • t-lc~ 
~w.4? 
~ 
that damage awards may not be paid out of the Treasury without ------------
There are arguments on the legislation creating such a remedy. 
- - ·-· --- ·---~ ---- -.- ......... _ 
other side. It has been argued that the Just Compensation Clause 
was motivated by a distrust of legislatures. Note, The Origins 
and Original Significance of the Just Compensation Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment, 94 Yale L.J. 694 (1985). If this is so, it is 
.,-v4 ! 
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• unlikely that the Framers would have expected legislatures to 
waive sovereign immunity. And yet the very words of the Clause 
contemplate, not an injunction, but the payment of damages. The 
state cases cited by the SG are not particularly persuasive 
authority. The Fifth Amendment originally applied only against 
• 
the federal government, and the federal government did not ~ 
attempt to exercise its power of eminent domain until the 1870's. 
Id., 709 n. 78. {Before that time, the federal government 
apparently relied on the States when it needed land condemned.) 
The SG concedes that the Court has stated in dicta that the Just ------Compensation Clause has a "self-executing character." United 
States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 {1980), quoting 6 P. Nichols, 
Eminent Domain §25.41 (3rd rev. ed 1972) . 
I do not think it is necessary to decide whether the 
Taking Clause is self-executing. As the SG points out, there is 
no practical need for a decision. If a State refuses to provide 
an adequate remedy, property-owners may sue state officials under 
42 u.s.c. § 1983. Moreover, once the Court holds that 
.....,___.... ' 
invalidation of an ordinance is not a constitutionally adequate 
remedy for a temporary taking, it is likely that the States will 
provide means of obtaining compensation. I therefore recommend 
that the Court hold: (1) that even a "temporary" taking without 
payment of just compensation violates the Fifth Amendment; {2) 
that it is unnecessary to decide the difficult question whether 
property owners may sue directly under the Taking Clause, because 
~ ---- --~ .., -
they may do so under §1983 or the Tucker Act {against the federal 
government); and (3) that §1983 cases alleging a taking should be 
- - 11. 
• decided under traditional taking principles. This disposition 
may ef feci tvely deprive the Church of any remedy, because it 
neglected to sue under §1983. Although this may be unfortunate, 
• 
it seems a small price for avoiding the "self-execution" issue. 
It also is unnecessary in this case to consider how the 
courts should calculate the compensation due for a temporary 
taking. This complicated issue should be left for development in 
the lower courts. 
III. CONCLUSION 
This case is a real "mare's nest." In view of the strong 
public interest in resolving this issue on the merits, I conclude 
that the Court has jurisdiction, and that, for purposes of this 
decision, it has been finally determined that the Church has been 
deprived of any beneficial use of its land. 
I recommend that you vote to REVERSE the judgment of the 








85-1199 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los 
Angeles (Calif. Court of Appeal) 
MEMO TO FILE: 
This case was held last Term for our decision in 
MacDonald v. Yolo, decided last June - a case in which we 
hoped to reach the validity of the California Rule with 
respect to a "taking" of property that results form an 
exercise of the state's police power. The California rule 
decided in Agins v. City of Tiburon, (Supreme Court of 
California in 1979) held that: 
"... when an ordinance, even a nonzoning 
ordinance, deprives a person of the total use of 
his land his challenge to the ordinan~ is by 
way of ~ eclaratory relief or possibly mandamus 
(not damages)". 
In Yolo, we could not reach the validity of the 
California rule. That case came to us in a posture where 
a "taking" could occur, but there had been no finding as 
to the extent of any specific taking. We also thought a 
"beneficial economic use" might remain. 
Justice Stevens who wrote Yolo, recommended in his 
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opportunity to decide the validity of the California Rule. 
My clerk Bob Stack - in his note on Justice Steven's memo 
- said this "looks like finally a chance to decide the San 
Diego Gas Company issue". That was a case in which four 
of us ( see Justice Brennan's dissent) thought the issue 
was before us, but five Justices did not. Justice 
Rehnquist in his concurring opinion indicated that if the 
issue had been before the Court, it would have presented a 
serious question. 
Unhappily, after a preliminary reading of the 
complaint, the decision of the California Court of 
Appeals, briefs of the parties and the SG's brief, I am 
not at all sure that we will not be frustrated again. I 
can recall only few cases in which the basic documents -
apart from the SG's brief - are so miserably written. 
In brief summary, appellant owned 21 acres of land in 
the valley of a river north of Los Angeles. It had 
operated a camp there for recreation by church members and 
handicapped children of all denominations. As a result of 
forest fires that denuded the hills around the campsite {I 
am not sure it is on a river but at least it was in a 
valley) , a serious flood occurred that destroyed all of 
'-. · 
the buildings of this camp. 
- - 3. 
As a result of this storm and the resulting damage, 
the County first adopted a temporary ordinance that 
subsequently was included as a permanent provision of the 
County Code. This Code Section, 22.44-220 provided that: 
" •.• Noone may use, erect, construct, move 
on to or ... modify, enlarge or reconstruct any 
building or structure within the boundaries of a 
flood protection district .•. , with certain 
exceptions not relevant here." See 
Jurisdictional Statement A-32. 
Petitioner filed a complaint in a California Superior 
Court that is an object lesson as to how not to write a 
complaint. 
Appendix. 
See the "Amended Complaint P5-16, Joint 
With respect to the "taking" issue, pages 11 
and 12 are just about all that is relevant. It is alleged 
that appellant's property is within the flood protection 
area created by Ordinance No. 11, 855 [this was the 
preliminary ordinance made permanent in the County Code, 
see above]. The complaint then alleges that this 
Ordinance "denies [appellantl all use of Lutherglen" the -----
name of this 21-acre tract. The relief sought simply is 
"damages, including loss of use of Lutherglen", and 
attorneys' fees. The complaint makes no mention of any 
constitutional provision, state or federal. Appellant's 
brief preports to explain this by saying the "complaint 
.. 
• 
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alleged the facts, rather than legal theories, as required 
by California practice." P 2, n. 3. Possibly because of 
the foregoing inadequacies, the California Trial Court 
entered a "nonsuit" with respect to the "taking" issue. 
Although I am not clear what a nonsuit is under California 
law, the State Court of Appeals first read the complaint 
as alleging an "inverse condemnation" action in which 
appellant claimed that "the damage to Lutherglen 
constituted a taking without compensation contrary" to the 
California Constitution. 
The Court of Appeals stated that in "reviewing a 
nonsuit [it] must view the evidence as though the judgment 
had gone in favor of the plaintiff " . . . . P A 5. Then, 
the Court of Appeals stated that it would "consider only 
the grounds specified in the appellees' motion for 
nonsuit". The Court of Appeals then said: 
"The reason for this limitation here is 
that the plaintiff should be given the 
opportunity to correct any deficiency in his 
proof before a nonsuit is granted." A6. 
When addressing specifically the issue we hope was 












Lutherglen by County Ordinance No. 11,855, 
adopted on January 11, 1979. The trial court 
struck this portion of the first cause of 
action, stating: "[A] careful rereading of the 
Agins [Agins v. City of Tiburon (1979) 24 CAl. 
3d 266) case persuades the Court that when an 
ordinance, even a nonzoning ordinance, deprives 
a person of the t g_tal use_ 2_f his lands, his 
challenge to the orMna nce TS tly way of 




As I read the opinion of the California Court of 
Appeals, particularly that quoted above, the following 
appears to be the situation: Because the TC ordered a 
"nonsuit", under California procedure we must assume the -truth of the allegations in the complaint. As 
unsatisfactory as they are, apparently the California 
Court of Appeals - as is indicated by the excerpt quoted 
above - viewed them as stating that the County Ordinance 
"deprived" appellant of the "total use of [its] lands." 
This is the position taken by appellants' brief, but is 
disputed with some vigor in the unartful brief of 
appellee. Indeed, the SG's brief is also unsatisfactory -
at least as it appears on a first reading - because it 
does not accept what seems to me to be the view of the 
Calfifornia courts that appellant was deprived of the 
total use of its lands by the County Ordinance. 
• 
• 
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In such a situation, the law in California since 1979 
has been that no damages may be recovered - either under 
the California or the U.S. Constitution. The only relief 
available is "by way of declaratory judgment or possibly 
mandamus". It is important to remember that when Agins 
reached this Court, we decided the case on different 
grounds. We intimated, however, that if the landowner had 
been deprived of all "economically beneficial use", there 
would have been a "taking" requiring just compensation. 
This test - the deprivation of all "economically 
beneficial use" - was articulated in Penn Central, and we 
have reiterated several times since. This was found to be 
situation in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon. Although no 
opinion has been circulated in our Pennsylvania Coal case 
argued this Term, I believe the majority Justices will say 
that there was no such taking under the present 
Pennsylvania Statute. 
I joined Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in San 
Diego Gas and Electric. In view of what Justice Rehnquist 
said in his concurring opinion in that case, I think it 
fair to say that five of us would find a violation of the 
taking clause where it was clear that no viable use of the 
land remained. Unless we reached such conclusion, this 
• 
• 
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Court will have rewritten the taking clause of the Federal 
Constitution. 
Thus, if we reach the merits of this question, I will 
certainly vote to reverse. 
My concerns remain, however, as to whether the 
question is properly here. The SG argues that it is not, 
although conceding - as I recall - that one may read the 
California Court of Appeal's decision as finding that 
appellant has been deprived of the "total use of its 
lands". The SG makes the further argument that since 
appellants' complaint made no mention of the Federal 
Constitution or indeed federal law, we may not have 
federal court jurisdiction to decide the case. I am not 
at all sure the taking question is properly before us. 
I do note my surprise that the SG argues that the 
taking clause of the Fifth Amendment, applicable to the 
states under the Fourteenth Amendment, "does not give rise 
to a constitutionally compelled damage remedy against the 
government". See the SG's Summary of Argument, and P. 26 
et seq of his brief. For me, this would be a shocking 
position for the federal government to take. 
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My clerk's views will be welcome. I would like to 
conclude that we have appellate jurisdiction, that we are 
bound by the California court's acceptance of the 
allegation of the complaint with respect to the taking, 
and that therefore we can decide the question that has 
eluded us now for several years. I hardly need say that I 
think the California rule would leave private property 
owners at the unregulated mercy of city councils, the 
legislatures, state administrative agencies, and of course 
the federal government and federal agencies. 
LFP, Jr. 
450U.S. 
s where government 
destruction of the 
E . g., Kaiser Aetna 
(navigational servi-
ted States v. Dickin-
erty flooded because 
ates v. Causby, 328 
v altitude flights of 
: Pennsylvania Coal 
te regulation forbid-
1ing ordinances and 
the use and -enjoy-
;he public good just 
>r physical invasion 
r's point of view, it 
ndemned or flooded, 
to use in its natural 
rive him of all bene-
1 point of view, the 
vation of open space 
G as from creating a 
1ation or increasing 
>ject that floods pri-
G the distinction that 
through condemna-
s not through police 
illees 43. But "the 
:ontended that the city's 
1 beneficial or economical 
App. 11. Although the 
ect, see n. 8, supra, the 
"to have the property 
1tate so open space and 
: property is being 'used' 
SAN DIEGO GAS & ELECTRIC CO. v. SAN DIEGO 653 
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Constitution measures a taking of property not by what a 
State says, or by what it intends, but by what it does." 
Hughes v. Washington, 389 U. S. 290, 298 (1967) (STEWART, 
J ., concurring) (emphasis in original) ; see Davis v. Newton 
Coal Co. , 267 U.S. 292, 301 (1925). It is only logical, then , 
that government action other than acquisition of title, occu-
pancy, or physical invasion can be a ''taking," and therefore 
a de facto exercise of the power of eminent domain, where 
the effects completely deprive the owner of all or most of his 
interest in the property. United States v. Dickinson, supra, \ \ 
at 748; United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 
378 (1945). 
IV 
Having determined that property may be "taken for public -use" by police power regulation within the meanmg of the 
Just Compensation Clause of the 'Fifth A mendment, the 
question remamswlieffier a government enfaty""'may consti-
tutionally deny payment of just compensation to the prop-
erty owner and limit his remedy to mere invalidation of the 
regulation instead. Appellant argues that it is entitled to 
the full fair market value of the property. Appellees argue 
that invalidation of the regulation is sufficient without pay-
ment of monetary compensation. In my view, once a court 
establishes that there was a regulatory "taking," the Consti-
tution demands that the government entity pay just com-
pensation for the period commencing on the date the regula-
tion first effected the "taking," and ending on the date the 
government entity chooses to rescind or otherwise an1end 
19 
the regulation.20 This interpretation, I believe, is supported 
19 Under this rule, a government entity is entitled to amend the offend-
ing regulation so that it no longer effects a "taking." It may also choose 
formally to condemn the property. 
20 Amicus suggests that the California Supreme Court has not conclu-
sively decided the issue whether interim damages might be awarded to 
compensate a landowner for economic loss sustained prior to invalidation 
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by the express words and purpose of the Just Compensation 
CJause, as well as by cases of this Court construing it. 
The Janguage of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the "tak-
[ing]" of private property for "public use" without payment 
of "just compensation." As soon as private property has 
been taken, whether through formaJ condemnation proceed-
ings, occupancy, physical invasion, or regulation, the land-
owner has already suffered a constitutional violation, and 
"'the self-executing character of the constitutiona] provision 
with respect to compensation,'" United States v. Clarke, 445 
U. S. 253, 257 (1980) , quoting 6 J. Sackman, Nichols' Law of 
Eminent Domain § 25.41 (rev. 3d ed. 1980) , is triggered. This 
Court has consistently recognized that the just compensa-
tion requirement in the Fifth Amendment is not precatory: 
once there is a "taking," compensation must be awarded. In 
Jacobs v. United States, 290 U. S. 13 (1933) , for example, a 
Government dam project creating intermittent overflows onto 
petitioners' property resulted in the "taking" of a servitude. 
Petitioners brought suit against the Government to recover 
just compensation for the partial "taking." Commenting on 
the nature of the landowners' action, the Court observed: 
"The suits were based on the right to recover just com-
pensation for property taken by the United States for 
public use in the exercise of its power of eminent domain. 
That right was guaranteed by the Constitution. The 
fact that condemnation proceedings were not instituted 
and that the right was asserted in suits by the owners 
did ·not change the essential nature of the c]aim. The 
form of the remedy did not qua]ify the right. It rested 
upon the Fifth Amendment. Statutory recognition was 
not necessary. A promise to pay was not necessary. 
23, and n. 24. But since the California courts fail to concede that a 
regulation can effect a "taking," any award of interim damages would 
not be justified or determined, as constitutionally required, under the 
Just Compensation Clause. 
BO 
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BRENNAN, J ., dissenting 
Such a promise was implied because of the duty to pay 
imposed by the Amendment." Id. , at 16. 
See also Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U. S. 84, 84-85, 
88-90 (1962); United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. , at 268.21 
arca-li<lat-ioll-lmac.comnanied byJ _Jll;Jllent of damages would 
ate_the landowner for an;x economic loss suf-
the time his property was taken.22 
21 Amici suggP-st that the Court's awards of just compensation in cases 
involving the United States were premised either on a "theory of implied 
promise to pay ... or [on] congressional authorization [to pay] under 
the Tucker Act, 28 U. S. C. 1346 (a) ." Brief for United States as Amicus 
Curiae 27; see Brief for the National Trust for Historic Preservation et al. 
as Amici Curiae 7-8. This suggestion mischaracterizes the import of our 
cases. As the Court has noted: 
"But whether the theory . .. be that there was a taJcing under the Fifth 
Amendment, and that therefore the Tucker Act may be invoked because 
it is a claim founded upon the Constitution, or that there was an implied 
promise by the Government to pay for it, is immaterial. In either event, 
the claim traces back to the prohibition of the Fifth Amendment, 'nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.' The 
Constitution is 'intended to preserve practical and substantial rights, not 
to maintain theories.'" United States v. Dickinson, 331 U. S. 745, 748 
(1947). 
22 The instant litigation is a good case in point. The trial court, on 
April 9, 1976, found that the city's actions effected a "taking" of appel-
lant's property on June 19, 1973. If true, then appellant has been de-
prived of all beneficial use of its property in violation of the Just Com-
pensation Clause for the past seven years. 
Invalidation hardly prevents enactment of subsequent unconstitutional 
regulations by the government entity. At the 1974 annual conference of 
the National Institute of Municipal Law Officers in California, a Califor-
nia City Attorney gave fellow City Attorneys the following advice: 
"IF ALL ELSE FAILS, MERELY AMEND THE REGULATION 
AND START OVER AGAIN. 
"If legal preventive maintenance does not work, and you still receive a 
claim attacking the land use regulation, or if you try the case and lose, 
don't worry about it . All is not lost . One of the ext ra 'goodies ' contained 
in the recent [California] Supreme Court case of Selby v. City of San 
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Moreover, mere invalidation would fall far short of ful-
filling the fundamental purpose of the Just Compensation 
Clause. That guarantee was designed to bar the government 
from forcing some individuals to bear burdens which, in all 
fairness, should be borne by the public as a whole. Arm-
strong v. United States, 364 U. S. 40, 49 (1960). See Agins 
v. City of Tiburon, 447 U. S., at 260; Andrus v. Allard, 444 
U. S., at 65. When one person is asked to assume more than 
a fair share of the public burden, the payment of just com-
pensation operates to redistribute that economic cost from 
the individual to the public at large. See United States v. 
Willow River Co., 324 U. S. 499, 502 (1945); Monongahel.a 
Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U. S. 312, 325 (1893). 
Because police power regulations must be substantially re-
lated to the advancement of the public health, safety, morals, 
or general welfare, see Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 
272 U. S. 365, 395 (1926), it is axiomatic that the public 
receives a benefit while the off ending regulation is in effect. 23 
If the regulation denies the private property owner the use 
and enjoyment of his land and is found to effect a "taking," 
it is only fair that the public bear the cost of benefits re-
ceived during the interim period between application of the 
regulation in question, even after trial and judgment, make it more reason-
able, more restrictive, or whatever, and everybody starts over again. 
"See how easy it is to be u City Attorney. Sometimes you can · 
lose the battle and still win the war. Good luck." Longtin, Avoiding 
and Defending Constitutional Attacks on Land Use Regulations (Includ-
ing Inverse Condemnation), in 38B NIMLO Municipal Law Review 192-
193 (1975) (emphasis in original). 
23 A different case may arise where a police power regulation is not 
enacted in furtherance of the public health, safety, morals, or general wel-
fare so that there may be no "public use." Although the government 
entity may not be forced to pay just compensation under the Fifth 
Amendment, the landowner may nevertheless have a damages cause of 
action under 42 U. S. C. § 1983 for a Fourteenth Amendment due process 
violation. 
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regulation and the government entity's rescission of it. The 
payment of just compensation serves to place the landowner 
in the same position monetarily as he would have occupied 
if his property had not been taken. Almota Farmers Eleva-
tor & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 473-474 
(1973); United States v. Reynolds, 397 U. S. 14, 16 (1970). 
The fact that a regulatory "takin " may be temporary b 
~dr ue o e governmen s power to rescin or amend the 
regulation , does not make i1i_,any less of a constitutional "tak-
ing." Nothing in the Just Compensation Clause suggests 
~ "takings" must be permanent and irrevocable. Nor 
does the temporary reversible quality of a regulatory "tak-
ing" render compensation for the time of the "taking" any 
less obligatory. This Court more than once has recognized 
that temporary reversible "takings" should be analyzed ac-
cording to the same constitutional framework applied to 
permanent irreversible "takings." For example, in United 
States v. Causby, supra, at 258-259, the United States had 
executed a lease to use an airport for a one-year term "end-
ing June 30, 1942, with a provision for renewals until June 
30, 1967, or six months after the end of the national emer-
gency, whichever [was] the earlier." The Court held that 
the frequent low-level flights of Army and Navy airplanes 
over respondents' chicken farm, located near the airport, ef-
fected a "taking" of an easement on respondents' property. 
328 U. S., at 266-267. However, because the flights could be 
discontinued by the Government at any time, the Court re-
manded the case to the Court of Claims: "Since on this rec-
ord it is not clear whether the easement taken is a permanent 
or a temporary one, it would be premature for us to consider 
whether the amount of the award made by the Court of 
Claims was proper." Id., at 268 (emphasis added). In 
other cases where the Government has taken only temporary 
use of a building, land, or equipment, the Court has not 
hesitated to determine the appropriate measure of just com-
pensation. See Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 
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U.S. 1, 6 (1949); United States v. Petty Motor Co. , 327 U. S. 
372, 374-375 (1946) ; United States v. General Motors Corp., 
323 U. S. , at 374-375. 
But contrary to appellant's claim that San Diego must 
formally condemn its property and pay full fair market value, 
nothing in the Just Compensation Clause empowers a court 
to order a government entity to condemn the property and 
pay its full fair market value, where the "taking" already 
effected is temporary and reversible and the government 
wants to halt the "taking." Just as the government may 
cancel condemnation proceedings before passage of title , see 
6 J. Sackman, Nichols' Law of Eminent Domain § 24.113, p. 
24-21 (rev. 3d ed. 1980), or abandon property it has tem-
porarily occupied or invaded, see United States v. Dow, 357 
U. S. 17, 26 (1958), it must have the same power to rescind 
a regulatory "taking." As the Court has noted: "[A]n aban-
donment does not prejudice the property owner. It merely 
results in an alteration of the property interest taken-from 
full ownership to one of temporary use and occupation .... 
In such cases compensation would be measured by the prin-
ciples normally governing the taking of a right to use prop-
erty temporarily." Ibid.; see Danforth v. United States, 308 
U. S. 271 , 284 (1939). 
The constitutional rule I propose requires that, once a 
court finds that a police power regulation has effected a "tak-
ing," the government entity must pay just compensation for 
the period commencing on the date the regulation first ef-
fected the "taking," and ending on the date the government 
entity chooses to rescind or otherwise amend the regulation.24 
Ordinary principles determining the proper measure of just 
compensation, regularly applied in cases of permanent and 
24 Contrary to the suggestion of amici, see, e. g., Brief for the National 
Trust for Historic Preservation et al . as Amici Curiae 13-16, this is not a 
case involving implication of a damages remedy-the words of the Just 
Compensation Clause are express. 
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temporary "takings" involving formal condemnation proceed-
ings, occupations, and physical invasions, should provide 
guidance to the courts in the award of compensation for a 
regulatory "taking." As a starting point, the value of the 
property taken may be ascertained as of the date of the "tak-
ing." United States v. Clarke, 445 U. S., at 258; Almota 
Farmers Elevator&: Warehouse Co. v. United States, supra, 
at 474; United States v. Miller, 317 U. S. 369, 374 (1943); 
Olson v. United States, 292 U. S. 246, 255 (1934). The gov-
ernment must inform the court of its intentions vis-a-vis the 
regulation with sufficient clarity to guarantee a correct as-
sessment of the just compensation award. Should the gov-
ernment decide immediately to revoke or otherwise amend 
the regulation, it would be liable for payment of compensa-
tion only for the interim during which the regulation effected 
a "taking." 25 Rules of valuation already developed for tem-
porary "takings" may be particularly useful to the courts in 
their quest for asses.sing the proper measure of monetary re-
lief in cases of revocation or amendment, see generally Kim-
ball Laundry Co. v. United States, su-pra; United States v. 
Petty Motor Co., su-pra; United States v. General Motors 
Corp., supra, although additional rules may need to be de-
veloped, see Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, su-pra, at 
21-22 (Rutledge, J., concurring); United States v. Miller, 
su-pra, at 373-374. Alternatively the government may choose 
25 See generally D. Hagman & D. Misczynski , Windfalls for Wipeouts 
296-297 (1978); Bosselman, The Third Alternative in Zoning Litigation, 
17 Zoning Digest 113, 114-119 (1965) . The general notion of compen-
sating landowners for regulations which go too far has received much at-
tention in land-use planning literature. See, e. g., Costonis, "Fair" Com-
pensation and the Accommodation Power: Antidotes for the Talcing 
Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 Colum. L. Rev. 1021 (1975) ; R. 
Babcock, The Zoning Game 168-172 (1966); Krasnowiecki & Paul, The 
Preservation of Open Space in Metropolitan Areas, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
179, 198-239 (1961) . See also American Law Institute, A Model Land 
Development Code§§ 5-303, 5-304, pp. 202-207 (1975) ; Town and Coun-
try Planning Act, 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, ch. 51, § 19. 
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formally to condemn the property, or otherwise to continue 
the offending regulation: in either case the action must be 
sustained by proper measures of just compensation. See gen-
erally United States v. Fuller, 409 U. S. 488, 490-492 (1973); 
United States ex rel. TVA v. Powelson, 319 U. S. 266, 281-
285 (1943). 
It should be noted that the Constitution does not embody 
any specific procedure or form of remedy that the States 
must adopt: "The Fifth Amendment expresses a principle 
of fairness and not a technical rule of procedure enshrining 
old or new niceties regarding 'causes of action'-when they 
are born, whether they proliferate, and when they die." 
United States v. Dickinson, 331 U. S., at 748. Cf. United 
· States v. Memphis Cotton Oil Co., 288 U.S. 62, 67-69 (1933). 
The States should be free to experiment in the implementa-
tion of this rule, provided that their chosen procedures and 
remedies comport with the fundamental constitutional com-
mand. See generally Hill, The Bill of Rights and the Super-
visory Power, 69 Colum. L. Rev. 181, 191-193 (1969). The 
only constitutional requirement is that the landowner must 
be able meaningfully to challenge a regulation that allegedly 
effects a "taking," and recover just compensation if it does 
so. He may not be forced to resort to piecemeal litigation or 
otherwise unfair procedures in order to receive his due. See 
United States v. Dickinson, supra, at 749. 
V 
In Agins v. City of Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d, at 275, 598 P. 2d, 
at 29, the California Supreme Court waa "persuaded by vari-
ous policy considerations to the view that inverse condemna-
tion is an inappropriate and undesirable remedy in cases in 
which unconstitutional regulation is alleged." In particular, 
the court cited "the need for preserving a degree of freedom 
in land-use planning function, and the inhibiting financial 
force which inheres in the inverse condemnation remedy," in 
reaching its conclusion. Id., at 276, 598 P. 2d, at 31. But 
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1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 85-1199 
FIRST ENGLISH EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN 
CHURCH OF GLENDALE , APPELLANT v. 
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, 
CALIFORNIA 
ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL OF CALIFORNIA, 
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 
[February - , 1987) 
CHIEF JUSTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
In this case the California Court of Appeal held that a land-
owner who claims that his property has been "taken" by a 
land-use regulation may not recover damages for the time be-
fore it is finally determined that the regulation constitutes a 
"taking" of his property. We disagree, and conclude that on 
the record in this case the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the United States Constitution require compensa-
tion for that period. 
In 1957, appellant First English Evangelical Lutheran 
Church purchased a 21-acre parcel of land in a canyon along 
the banks of the Middle Fork of Mill Creek in the Angeles 
National Forest. The Middle Fork is the natural drainage 
channel for a watershed area owned by the National Forest 
Service. Twelve of the acres owned by the church are flat 
land, and contained a dining hall, two bunkhouses, a care-
taker's lodge, an outdoor chapel, and a footbridge across the 
creek. The church operated on the site a campground, 
known as "Lutherglen," as a retreat center and a recreational 
area for handicapped chilu.ren. · 
In July 1977, a forest fire denuded the hills upstream from 
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tershed area and creating a serious flood hazard. Such 
flooding occurred on February 9 and 10, .1978, when a storm 
dropped 11 inches of rain in the watershed. The runoff from 
the storm overflowed the banks of the Mill Creek, flooding 
Lutherglen and destroying its buildings. 
In response to the flooding of the canyon:, appellee County 
of Los Angeles adopted Interim Ordinance No. 11,855 in Jan-
uary 1979. The ordinance provided that "[a] person shall not 
construct, reconstruct, place or enlarge any building or struc-
ture, any portion of which is, or will be, located within the 
outer boundaries of the interim flood protection area located 
in Mill Creek Canyon .... " App. to Juris. Statement A31. 
The ordinance was effective immediately because the County 
determined that it was "required for the immediate preserva-
tion of the public health and safety .... " Id., at A32. The 
interim flood protection area described by the ordinance in-
cluded the flat areas on either side of Mill Creek on which 
Lutherglen had stood. 
The church filed a complaint in the Superior Court of Cali-
fornia a little more than a month after the ordinance was 
adopted. As subsequently amended, the cpmplaint alleged 
two claims against the County and the Los Angeles County 
Flood Control District. The(1irst)alleged that the defendants 
were liable under Cal. Gov't. 'cocf e Ann. § 835 1 for dangerous 
conditions on their upstream properties that contributed to 
the flooding of Lutherglen. As a part of this claim, appellant 
als~ll~hat "Ordinance~- 11,855 denies [appellant] all 
usforLutne!filen." App. 12, 4r-The ~ sought 
to recover from the Flood District in inverse condemnation 
and in tort for engaging in cloud seeding during the storm 
that flooded Lutherglen. Appellant sought damages under 
each count for loss of use of Lutherglen. The defendants 
moved to strike the portions of the complaint alleging that 
1 Section 835 of the California Government Code establishes conditions 
under which a public entity may be liable "for injury caused by a dangerous 
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the County's ordinance denied all use of Lutherglen, on the 
view that the California Supreme Court's decision in Agins v. 
Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P. 2d 25 (1979), aff'd on other 
grounds, 447 U. S. 255 (1980), rendered the allegation "en-
tirely immaterial and irrelevant[, with] no bearing on any 
conceivable cause of action herein." App., at 22. See Cal. 
Civ. Pro. Code Ann. § 436 ("The court may . . . strike out any 
irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any 
pleading"). 
In Agins v. Tiburon, supra, the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia decided that a landowner may not maintain an inverse 
condemnation suit in the courts of that state based upon a 
"regulatory" taking. 24 Cal. 3d, at 276-277, 598 P. 2d, at 29. 
In the court's view, maintenance of such a suit would allow a 
. landowner to force the legislature to exercise its power of 
eminent domain. Under this decision, then, compensation is 
not required until the challenged regulation or ordinance has 
been held excessive in an action for declaratory relief or a 
writ of mandamus and the government has nevertheless de-
cided to continue the regulation in effect. Based on this de-
cision, the tr· al court in the resent case anted the motion 
to strike the a legation that t e churc ha been em all 
useof Lutherglen. It explained that "a careful rereading of , 
[ 
the Agins case persuades the Court that when an ordinance, 
even a non-zoning ordinance, deprives a person of the total 
us~s, his challenge to the or mance is by way of 
declaratory relief or possibly mandamus." App. , at 26. Be-
cause the appellant alleged a regulatory taking and sought 
only damages, the allegation that the ordinance denied all use 
of Lutherglen was deemed irrelevant. 2 
2 The trial court also granted defendants' motion for judgment on the 
pleadings on the second cause of action, based on cloud seeding. It limited 
trial on the first cause of action for damages under Cal. Gov't. Code Ann. 
§ 835, rejecting the inverse condemnation claim. At the close of plaintiff's 
evidence, the trial court granted a nonsuit on behalf of def P.ndants, dismiss-
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On appeal, the Ca~a ~ of.A_EE.eal read the com-
plaint as one seeking" damages for tne uncompensated taking 
of all use of Lutherglen by County Ordinance No. 11,855 
.... " App. to Juris. Statement, at A13-A14. It too relied 
on the California Supreme Court's decision in Agins in reject-
ing the cause of action, declining appellant's invitat1on to re-
evaluate Agins in light of this Court's opinions in San Diego 
Gas & Electric Co. v. San Diego, 450 U. S. 621 (1981). The 
court found itself obligated to follow Agins "because the 
United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the ques-
tion of whether a state may constitutionally limit the remedy 
for a taking to nonmonetary relief .... " App. to Juris. 
Statement, at A16. It accordingly affirmed the trial court's 
decision to strike the allegations concerning appellee's ordi-
nance. 3 The Supreme Court of California denied review. 
3 The California Court of Appeal also affirmed the lower court's orders 
limiting the issues for trial on the first cause of action, granting a nonsuit 
on the issues that proceeded to trial, and dismissing the second cause of 
action-based on cloud seeding-to the extent it was founded on a theory 
of strict liability in tort. The court reversed the trial court's ruling that a 
the second cause of action could not be maintained against the Flood Con-
trol District under the theory of inverse condemnation. The case was re-
manded for further proceedings on this claim. 
These circumstances alone, apart from the more particular issues pre-
sented in takings cases and discussed in the text, require us to consider 
whether the pending resolution of further liability questions deprives us of 
jurisdiction because we are not presented with a "final judgment[] or de-
cree[]" within the meaning of 28 U. S. C. § 1257. We think that this case 
is fairly characterized as one "in which the federal issue, finally decided by 
the highest court in the State [in which a decision could be had], will sur-
vive regardless of the outcome of future state court proceedings." Cox 
Broadcasting_ Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 480 (1975). As we explain 
infra,-----, the California Court of Appeal rejected appellant's fed-
eral claim that it was entitled to just compensation from the county for the 
taking of its property; this distinct issue of federal law will survive and re-
quire decision no matter how further proceedings resolve the issues con-
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This appeal followed, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 
478 U. S. --. Appellant asks us to hold that the Supreme 
Court of California erred in Agins v. Tiburon in determining 
that the Fifth Amendment, as made applicable to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment, does not require com-
pensation as a remedy for "temporary" regulatory takings-
those regulatory takings which are ultimately invalidated by 
the courts. 4 Four times this decade, we have considered 
similar claims andhave 1'ounaoursefves for one reason or an-
other unable to consider the merits of the Agins rule. See 
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U. S. 
-- (1986); Williamson County Regional Planning Com-
mission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U. S. 172 (1985); San Diego 
Gas & Electric Co., supra; Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255. 
For the reasons explained below, however, we find the con-
stitutional claim properly presented in this case, and hold I 
that on these facts the California courts have decided the 
compensation question inconsistently with the requirements 
of the Fifth Amendment. 
I 
Concerns with finality left us unable to reach the remedial 
question in the earlier cases where we have been asked to 
consider the rule of Agins. See MacDonald, Sommer & 
Frates, 477 U. S., at -- (summarizing cases). In each of 
these cases, we concluded either that regulations considered 
to be in issue by the state court did not effect a taking, Agins 
v. Tiburon, 447 U. S., at 263, or that the factual disputes yet 
to be resolved by state authorities might still lead to the con-
clusion that no taking had occurred. MacDonald, Sommer 
& Frates, 477 U. S., at--; Williamson County, 473 U. S., 
at--; San Diego Gas & Electric Co., 459 U. S., at 631-623. · 
' The Fifth Amendment provides "nor shall private property be taken 
for public use, without just compensation," and applies to the States 
through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. 
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Consideration of the remedial question in those circum-
stances, we concluded, would be premature. 
The posture of the present case is quite different. Appel-
lant's complaint alleged that "Ordinance No. 11,855 denies 
[it] all use of Lutherglen," and sought damages for this depri-
vation. App., at 12, 49. In affirming the decision to strike 
this allegation, the Court of Appeal assumed that the com-
plaint sought "damages for the uncompensated taking of all 
use of Lutherglen by County Ordinance No. 11,855." App. 
to Juris. Statement, at Al3-A14 (emphasis added). It relied 
on the California Supreme Court's Agins decision for the con-
clusion that "the remedy for a taking [is limited] to non-
monetary relief .. . . " Id. , at A16 (emphasis added). The 
disposition of the case on these grounds isolates the remedial 
question for our consideration. The rejection of appellant's 
allegations did not rest on the view that they were false. Cf. 
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates, 477 U. S., at--, n. 8 (Cal-
ifornia court rejected allegation in the complaint that appel-
lant was deprived of all beneficial use of its property.); Agins 
v. TilYuron, 447 U. S., at 259, n. 6 (same). Nor did the court 
rely on the theory that regulatory measures such as Ordi-
nance No. 11,855 may never constitute a taking in the 
constitutional sense. Instead, the claims were deemed irrel-
evant solely because of the California Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Agins that damages are unavailable to redress a "tem-
porary'' regulatory taking. 5 The California Court of Appeal 
5 It has been urged that the California Supreme Court's discussion of 
the compensation question in Agins v. Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P. 2d 25 
(1979), aff'd on other grounds, 447 U. S. 255 (1980), was dictum, because 
the court had already decided that the regulations could not work a taking. 
See Martino v. Santa Clara Valley Water District, 703 F. 2d 1141, 1147 
(CA9 1983) ("extended dictum"). The Court of Appeal in this case consid-
ered and rejected the possibility that the compensation discussion in Agins 
was dictum. See App. to Juris. Statement, at A14-A15, quoting Aptos 
Seascape Corp. v. County of Santa Cruz, 138 Cal. App. 3d 484, 493, 188 
Cal. Rptr. 191, 195 (1982) ("[I]t is apparent that the Supreme Court did not 
intend its discussion [of inverse condemnation as a remedy for a taking] to 
- -
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has thus held that regardless of the correctness of appellants' 
claim that the challenged ordinance denies it "all use of 
Lutherglen" appellant may not recover damages until the or-
dinance is finally declared unconstitutional, and then only for 
any period after that declaration for which the county seeks 
to enforce it. The constitutional question pretermitted in 
our earlier cases is therefore squarely presented here. 6 
We reject appellee's su ~hat, regardless of the 
state courts reatment of the question, we must independ-
en~ deq11ia~ f ~he complaint and resolve the 
takings claim on the merits berorewecairreach the remedial 
question. However "cryptic"-to use appellee's descrip-
tion-the allegations with respect to the taking were, the 
California courts deemed them sufficient to present the issue. r-
We accordingly have no occasion to decide whether the ordi-
nance at issue actually denied appellant all use of its prop-
erty 7 or whether the county might avoid the conclusion that 
be considered dictum. . . . and it has not been treated as such in subse-
quent Court of Appeal cases.") Whether treating the claim as a takings 
claim is inconsistent with the first holding of Agins is not a matter for our 
concern. It is enough that the court did so for us to reach the remedial 
question. 
6 Our cases have also required that one seeking compensation must 
"seek compensation through the procedures the State has provided for 
doing so" before the claim is ripe for review. Williamson County Re-
gional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U. S. 172, --. It 
is clear that appellant met this requirement. Having assumed that a tak-
ing occurred, the California court's dismissal of the action establishes that 
"the inverse condemnation procedure is unavailable ... . " Id., at--. 
The compensation claim is accordingly ripe for our consideration. 
' Because the issue was not raised in the complaint or considered rele-
vant by the California courts in their assumption that a taking had oc-
curred, we also do not co id th fi t of the County'i 'Permanent ordi-
nance '6n the cone usions of the courts below. That or mance, a opted in 
1981 an reproduce at pp. 1s. tatement A32-A33, provides that 
"[a] person shall not use, erect, construct, move onto, or . . . alter, modify, 
enlarge or reconstruct any building or structure within the boundaries of a 
flood protection district except . .. [a]ccessory buildings and structures 
that will not substantially impede the flow of water, including sewer, gas, 
- -
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a compensable taking had occurred by establishing that the 
denial of all use was insulated as a part of the state's author-
ity to enact safety regulations. See e. g., Goldblatt v. 
Hempstead, 369 U. S. 590 (1962); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 
239 U. S. 394 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623 (1887). 
These questions, of course, remain open for decision on the 
remand we direct today. We now turn to the question of 
whether the Just Compensation Clause requires the govern-
ment to pay for "temporary'' regulatory takings. 8 
electrical, and water systems, approved by the county engineer . . . [a]uto-
mobile parking facilities incidental to a lawfully established use ... [and] 
[f]lood-control structures approved by the chief engineer of the Los Ange-
les County Flood Control District." County Code § 22.44.220. 
8 In addition to challenging the finality of the takings decision below, 
appellee raises two other challenges to our jurisdiction. First, going to 
both the appellate and certiorari jurisdiction of this Court under 28 
U. S. C. § 1257, appellee alleges that appellant has failed to preserve for 
review any claim under federal law. Though the complaint in this case in-
voked only the California Constitution, appellant argued in the Court of 
Appeal that "recent Federal decisions .. . show the Federal Constitutional 
error in ... Agins[ v. Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d 266, 598 P. 2d 25 (1979)]." App. 
to Appellant's Opposition to Appellee's Second Motion to Dismiss A13. 
The Court of Appeal, by applying the state rule of Agins to dismiss appel-
lant's action, rejected on the merits the claim that the rule violated the 
United States Constitution. This disposition makes irrelevant for our pur-
poses any deficiencies in the complaint as to federal issues. Where the 
state court has considered and decided the constitutional claim, we need 
not consider how or when the question was raised. Manhattan Life Ins. 
Co. v. Cohen, 234 U. S. 123, 134 (1914). Having succeeded in bringing the 
federal issue into the case, appellant preserved this question on appeal to 
the Supreme Court of California, see App. to Appellant's Opposition to Ap-
pellee's Second Motion to Dismiss, at A14-A22, which declined to review 
its Agins decision. Accordingly, we find that the issue urged here was 
both raised and passed upon below. 
Second, appellant challenges our appellate jurisdiction on the grounds 
that the case below did not draw "in question the validity of the statute of 
any state . . . " 28 U. S. C. § 1257(2). There is, of course, no doubt that 
the ordinance at issue in this case is "the statute of [a] state" for purposes 
of§ 1257. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville , 422 U. S. 205, 207, n. 3 
(1975). As construed by the state courts, the complaint in this case al-
- -
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II 
Consideration of the compensation question must begin 
with direct reference to the language of the Fifth Amend-
ment, which provides in relevant part that "private property 
[shall not] be taken for public use without j1:1st compensa-
tion." As· its language indicates, and as the Court has fre-
quently noted, this provision does not prohibit the taking of 
private property, but instead places a condition on the exer-
cise of that power. See Williamson County, supra, at--; 
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., 452 
U. S. 264, 297, n. 40 (1981); Hurley v. Kincaid, 285 U. S. 95, 
104 (1932); Monongahela Navi,gation Co. v. United States, 
148 U. S. 312, 336 (1893); United States v. Jones , 109 U. S. 
513, 518 (1883). This basic understanding of the Amend-
ment makes clear that it is designed not to limit the govern-
mental interference with property rights per se, but rather to 
secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper inter-
ference amounting to a taking. Thus, Government action j 
that works a taking of property rights necessarily implicates 
the "constitutional obligation to pay just compensation." 
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U. S. 40, 49 (1960). 
We have recognized that a landowner is entitled to bring 
an action in inverse condemnation as a result of "'the self-
executing char~ stitutional provision with re-
spect to compensation .... "' United States v. Clarke, 445 
leged that the ordinance, by denying all use of the property, worked a tak-
ing without providing for just compensation. We have frequently treated 
such challenges to zoning ordinances as challenges to their validity under 
the federal constitut10n, and see no reason to revise that approach here. 
See, e. g., MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, -- U. S. --
(1986); ;Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U. S. 419 
(1982); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255 (1980); Penn Central Transporta-
tion Co. v. New York City , 438 U. S. 104 (1978). By holding that the fail-
ure to provide compensation was not unconstitutional, moreover, the Cali-
fornia courts upheld the validity of the statute against the particular 
federal constitutional question at issue here-just compensation-and the 
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U. S. 253, 256 (1980), quoting 6 P. Nichols, Eminent Domain 
§ 25.41 (3d rev. ed. 1972). As noted in JUSTICE BRENNAN'S 
dissent in San Die o Gas & Electric Co., 450U. S., at 620, it 
has been established at east smce acobs v. United States, 
290 U. S. 13 (1933), that claims for just compensation are 
grounded in the Constitution itself: 
"The suits were based on the right to recover compensa-
tion for property taken by the United States for public 
use in the exercise of its power of eminent domain. 
That right was guaranteed by the Constitution. The 
fact that condemnation proceedings were not instituted 
did not change the essential nature of the claim. The 
form of the remedy did not qualify the right. It rested 
upon the Fifth Amendment. Statutory recognition was 
not necessary. A promise to pay was not necessary. 
Such a promise was implied because of the duty imposed 
by the Amendment. The suits were thus founded upon 
the Constitution of the United States." Id., at 16. (Em-
phasis added). 
Jacobs, moreover, does not stand alone, for the Court has 
frequently repeated the view that, in the event of a taking, 
the compensation remedy is required by the Constitution. 
See e. g. , Kirby Forest Industries , Inc. v. United States, 467 
U. S. 1, 5 (1984); United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256, 267 
(1946); Seaboard Air Line Ry. Co. v. United States, 261 
U. S. 299, 304-306 (1923); Monongahela Navigation, supra, 
at 327. 9 
9 The Solicitor General urges ~ ohibitory nature of the Fifth 
Amendment, see supra, at --, combined with principles of sovereign im-
munity, establishes that the Amendment itself is only a limitation on the 
power of the Government to act, not a remedial provision. The cases cited 
in the text, we think, refu!.e the ar~ment of the United States that "the 
Constitution does not, of its own force , furnish the basis for a court to 
award monetary damages against the government." Brief for the United 
States as Amicus Curiae 14. Though arising in various factual and juris-
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It has also been established doctrine at least since Justice 
Holmes' opinion for the Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. 
Mahon, 260 U. S. 393 (1922) that "[t]he general rule at least 
is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, 
if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." 
Id., at 415. While- the typical taking occurs when the gov-
ernment acts to condemn property in the exercise of its 
power of eminent domain, the entire doctrine of inverse con-
demnation is predicated on the proposition that a taking may 
occur without such formal proceedings. In Pumpelly v. 
Green Bay Co., 13 Wal. 166, 177-178, construing a provision 
in the Wisconsin constitution identical to the Just Compensa-
tion Clause, this Court said: 
"It would be a very curious and unsatisfactory result if 
. . . it shall be held that if the government refrains from 
the absolute conversion of real property to the uses of 
the public it can destroy its value entirely, can inflict 
irreparable and permanent injury to any extent, can, in 
effect, subject it to total destruction without making any 
compensation, because, in the narrowest sense of that 
word, it is not taken for public use." 
Later cases have unhesitatingly applied this principle. See, 
e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U. S. 164 (1979); 
United States v. Dickinson, 331 U. S. 745, 750 (1947); United 
States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256 (1946). 
While the Supreme Court of California may not have actu-
ally disavowed this general rule in Agins, supra, we believe 
that it has truncated the rule by disallowing damages that oc-
curred prior to the ultimate invalidation of the challenged 
regulation. The Supreme Court of California justified its 
conclusion at length in the Agins opinion, concluding that: 
dictates the remedy for interference with property rights amounting to a 
taking. See San Diego Gas & Electric v. San Diego, 450 U. S. , at 655, 
n. 21 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting), quoting United States v. Dickinson, 331 
u. s. 745, 748 (1947). 
- -
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"In combination, the need for preserving a degree of 
freedom in the land-use planning function, and the in-
hibiting financial force which inheres in the inverse 
condemnation remedy, persuade us that on balance man-
damus or declaratory relief rather than inverse con-
demnation is the appropriate relief under the circum-
stances." Agins v. Tiburon, 24 Cal. 3d, at 276-277. 
We, of course, are not unmindful of these considerations, 
but they must be evaluated in the light of the command of the· 
Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The 
Court has recognized in more than one case that the govern-
ment may elect to abandon its intrusion or discontinue regu-
lations. See e.g., Kirby Forest Industries , Inc. v. United 
States , 467 U. S. 1 (1984); United States v. Dow, 357 U. S. 
17, 26 (1958). Similarly,a governmental body may acquiesce 
in a judicial declaration that one of its ordinances has affected 
an unconstitutional taking of property; the landowner has no 
right under the Just Compensation Clause to insist that a 
"temporary" taking be deemed a permanent taking. But we J 
have not resolved whether abandonment by the government 
requires payment of compensation for the period of time dur-
ing which regulations deny a landowner all use of his land. -
In considering this question, we find substantial guidance 
in cases where the government has only temporarily exer-
cised its right to use private property. In United States v. 
Dow, supra, at 26, though rejecting a claim that the Govern-
ment may not abandon condemnation proceedings, the Court 
observed that abandonment "results in an alteration in the 
property interest taken-from one of full ownership to one of 
temporary use and occupation . . . In such cases compensa-
tion would be measured by the principles normally governing 
the taking of a right to use property temporarily. See Kim-
ball Laundry Co. v. United States , 338 U. S. 1 [1949]; United 
States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U. S. 372 [1946]; United States 
v. General Motors Corp., 323 U. S. 373 [1945]." Each of the 
cases cited by the Dow Court involved appropriation of pri-
No~ 
4) f-1,,.._,.L 
~~,. ,,  
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vate property by the United States for use during World War -II. Though the takings were in fact "temporary," see Petty 
Motor Co., supra, at 375, there was no question that com-
pensation would be required for the Government's interfer-
ence with the use of the property; the Court was concerned in 
each case with determining the proper measure of the mone-
tary relief to which the property holders were entitled. See 
Kimball Laundry Co., supra, at 4-21; Petty Motor Co., 
supra, 377-381; General Motors , supra, at 379-384. 
These cases reflect the fact that "temporary'' takings 
which, as here, deny a landowner all use of his property, are 
not different in kind from permanent takings, for which the 
Constitution clearly requires compensation. Cf. San Diego 
Gas & Electric Co., supra, at 657 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting) 
("Nothing in the Just Compensation Clause suggests that 
'takings' must be permanent and irrevocable.") It is axio-
matic that the Fifth Amendment's just compensation provi-
sion is "designed to prevent the Government from forcing 
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fair-
ness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole. " 
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U. S., at 49. See also 
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 
U. S., at 123-125 (1978); Monongahela Navigation Co. v. 
United States , 148 U. S., at 325. In the present case the 
interim ordinance was adopted by the county of Los Angeles 
in~ 79, and became effective immediately. Appel-
lant filed suit within a month after the effective date of the 
ordinance and yet when the Supreme Court of California de-
nied a hearing in the case on October 17, 1985, the merits of 
appellant's claim had yet to be determined. The United / 
States has been required to pay compensation for leasehold 
interests of shorter duration than this. The value of a lease-
hold interest in property for a period of years may be sub-
stantial, and the burden on the property owner in extinguish-
ing such an interest for a period of years may be great 
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Where this burden results from governmental action that 
amounted to a taking, the Just Compensation Clause of the 
Fifth Amendment requires that the government pay the 
landowner for the value of the use of the land during this 
period. Cf. United States v. Causby, 328 U. S. 256, 261 ("It 
is the owner's loss, not the taker's gain, which is the measure 
of the value of the property taken.") Invalidation of the or-
dinance or its successor ordinance after this period of time, 
though converting the taking into a "temporary" one, is not a 
sufficient remedy to meet the demands of the Just Compen-
sation Clause. 
Appellee argues that requiring compensation for denial of 
all use of land prior to invalidation is inconsistent with this 
Court's decisions in Danforth v. United States , 308 U. S. 271 
(1939), and Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U. S. 255. In Danforth, 
the landowner contended that the "taking" of his property 
had occurred prior to the institution of condemnation pro-
ceedings, by reason of the enactment of the Flood Control 
Act itself. He claimed that the passage of that Act had di-
minished the value of his property because the plan embodied 
in the Act required condemnation of a flowage easement 
across his property. The Court held that in the context of 
condemnation proceedings a taking does not occur until com-
pensation is determined and paid, and went on to say that "a 
reduction or increase in the value of property may occur by 
reason of legislation for or the beginning or completion of a 
project," but "[s]uch changes in value are incid o own-
ership. They cannot be considered a 'ta · in tlie co sti-
tutional sense. " Danforth, supra, at 28 . Agins like · se ) 
rejected a claim that the city's prelimina acTivitie onsti-
tuted a taking, saying that "mere fluctuations · value during 
the process of governmental decisionmaking, absent extraor-
dinary delay, are 'incidents of ownership." ' See 447 U. S. , 
at 263, n. 9. 
But these cases merely stand for the unexceptional propo-
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must be calculated as of the time of the taking, and that 
depreciation in value of the property by reason of preliminary 
activity is not chargeable to the government. It would re-
quire a considerable extension of these decisions to say that 
no compensable regulatory taking has occurred until a chal-
lenged ordinance has ultimately been held invalid. 10 
Nothing we say today is intended to abrogate the principle 
that the decision to exercise the power of eminent domain is a 
legislative function, "'for Congress and Congress alone to de-
termine."' Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U. S. 
229, 240 (1984), quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U. S. 26, 33 
(1954). Once a court determines that a taking has occurred, 
the Government retains the whole range of options already 
available-amendment of the regulation, invalidation of the 
regulation, or exercise of eminent domain. Thus we do not, 
as the Solicitor General suggests, "permit a court, at the 
behest of a private person, to require the Government to ex-
ercise the power of eminent domain . . . . " Brief for the 
United States as Amicus Curiae 22. We merely hold that 
where the Government's activities have already worked a 
taki~ o~ use of prope~y, no subsequent action by the 
Government can relieve it of the duty to provide compensa-
tion for the period during which the taking was effective. 
10 Williamson County Regional Planning Commission, supra, is not to 
the contrary. There, we noted that "no constitutional violation occurs 
until compensation has been denied." 473 U. S., at--, n. 13. This 
statement, however, was addressed to the issue of whether the constitu-
tional claim was ripe for review and did not establish that compensation is 
unavailable for Government activity occurring before compensation is actu-
ally denied. Though, as a matter of law, an illegitimate taking might not 
occur until the Government refuses to pay, the interference that effects a 
taking might begin much earlier, and compensation is measured from that 
time. See Kirby Forest Industries, Inc. v. United States , 467 U. S. 1, 5 
(1984) (Where Government physically occupies land without condemnation 
proceedings, "the owner has a right to bring an 'inverse condemnation' suit 
to recover the value of the land on the date of the intrusion by the 
Government.") 
• 
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We also point oµt that the allegation of the complaint which 
we treat as true for purposes of our decision was that the or-
dinance in question denied appellant all use of its property. 
We limit our holding to'tfie facts presented, and of course do 
not deal with the quite different questions that would arise in 
the case of normal delays in obtaining building permits, 
changes in zoning ordinances, variances, and the like which 
are not before us. We realize that even our present holding 
will undoubtedly lessen to some extent the freedom and flex-
ibility of land-use planners and governing bodies of municipal 
corporations when enacting land-use regulations. But such 
consequences necessarily flow from any decision upholding a 
claim of constitutional right; many of the provisions of the 
Constitution are designed to limit the flexibility and freedom 
of governmental authorities and the Just Compensation 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment is one of them. As Justice 
Holmes aptly noted more than 50 years ago, "a strong public 
desire to improve the public condition is not enough to war-
rant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitu-
tional way of paying for the change." Pennsylvania Coal 
Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S., at 416. 
Here we must assume that the Los Angeles County ordi-
nances have denied appellant all use of his property for a 
considerable period of years, and we hold that invalidation of 
the ordinance without payment of fair value for the use of the 
property during this period of time would be a constitution-
ally insufficient remedy. The judgment of the California 
Court of Appeals is therefore reversed, and the case is re-
manded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this 
opinion. 
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I think tn i s is an excellen and a very important 
one. I recommend that you join. 
1. The opinion handles the "finality problems" very well. 
It is clear that the state cts. assumed that there had been a 
taking. Surely there is no reason for this Court to look behind 
this assumption. 
2. As I noted in my bench memo, the SG's argument that the 
Fifth Amendment is not "self executing" is substantial. There 
are arguments on the other side, however. The opinion relies on 
this Court's statements that the Amendment itself affords a dam-
ages remedy, and I think that is sufficient. As a practical mat-
ter, §1983 would not afford an adequate remedy in all cases, be-
cause of the various immunity doctrines. 
3. I agree with you that the holding that a "temporary tak-
ing" is compensable will have ramifications outside the regula-
tory setting. But, since you agree with the holding, there is no 
reason to insist on narrowing it! Moreover, it is necessary to 
the decision in this case to hold that a temporary regulatory 
taking is compensable. I can see no basis for distinguishing 
between regulatory takings and physical occupations on this 
• - - page 2. 
issue. If anything, a temporary physical occupation is the bet-
ter candidate for compensation, if only because it is the most 
obvious case of a taking. 
4. I have asked THE CHIEF JUSTICE' s clerk to distinguish 
your remark in Agins on the ground that the planning activities 
were not a taking. We have not agreed on specific language, be-
cause the cl:rk had to go to meet with the Chief, but I suggest 
simply inserti ng language from Agins that the California Supreme 
Court "correctly rejected the contention that the municipality's 
good-faith planning activities .•• so burdened [the Agins'] en-
joyment of property as to constitute a taking." 447 U.S., at 263 
n. 9. The insertion could go at the beginning of n. 10, p. 15. 
5. As you know, this decision will raise a number of diffi-
cult issues concerning the measurement of "just compensation" for 
a temporary taking. Some of the briefs in this case, and some of 
the clerks in the building, argue that these issues will be im-
possibly difficult, but I do not agree. The "Railroad Court," 
over which Judge Friendly presided, already has addressed similar 
problems arising out of the bankruptcies of the northeastern 
rail roads. 
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The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
- -
85-1199 First English Evangelical v. Los Angeles (Bob) 
CJ for the Court 1/27/87 
1st draft 2/18/87 
2nd draft 2/23/87 
3rd draft 5/12/87 






1st draft 5/6/87 
2nd draft 6/2/87 
SOC joins Parts I and III 5/11/87 
HAB joins Parts I and III 5/28/87 
SOC awaiting further writing 2/17/87 
JPS will dissent 2/23/87 
